Bernie Sanders’s most prominent message is economic, organized around a critique of capitalist inequality, an indictment of the ultrawealthy and a call for expansive new social programs. It helped propel him to a strong second in the 2016 Democratic primary campaign and has returned as the marquee message for his 2020 campaign, which he announced on Tuesday with a promise to “complete that revolution.”
Unfortunately for his 2020 campaign, Sanders is less distinct on economic policy than he was in 2016. His rivals for the Democratic presidential nomination have either embraced broad ideas like Medicare for all or unveiled their own: Elizabeth Warren’s universal child care proposal; Cory Booker’s plan to drastically reduce housing costs; Kamala Harris’s LIFT Act, which would build on the earned-income tax credit and create a new monthly cash payment for most middle-class households.
But Sanders isn’t without an advantage. If in 2016 his foreign-policy thinking was underbaked, then in 2019 he stands as one of the few candidates with a fully formed vision for American foreign policy. It’s one that ties his domestic focus on political and economic justice to a larger project of international cooperation and solidarity, anti-authoritarianism and promotion of democratic values. It’s a vision that rests on the conviction that progressive politics must continue past the water’s edge.
Sanders articulated the substance of his foreign policy views in two speeches: one in 2017 at Missouri’s Westminster College — speaking from the stage where Winston Churchill delivered his “Iron Curtain” speech — and one last October at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
In his Johns Hopkins address, Sanders offered a big-picture reading of this moment in international relations. For him, the ideological struggle of the 21st century doesn’t pit a liberal, democratic America against illiberal, authoritarian opponents, but instead pits liberal, democratic peoples everywhere against illiberalism at home and abroad. It’s a “worldwide movement toward authoritarianism, oligarchy and kleptocracy” against one toward “strengthening democracy, egalitarianism, and economic, social, racial and environmental justice.” In this conception of the world, President Trump is just one of many “demagogues who exploit people’s fears, prejudices and grievances to gain and hold on to power.”
These movements don’t emerge out of nothing. Sanders contends that they are fueled by the enormous disparities of wealth and opportunity that define global capitalism. This is the subject of his Westminster College speech — an attempt to link domestic economic issues to relations among states. “This planet will not be secure or peaceful when so few have so much, and so many have so little — and when we advance day after day into an oligarchic form of society where a small number of extraordinarily powerful special interests exert enormous influence over the economic and political life of the world,” Sanders said, adding later that “inequality, corruption, oligarchy and authoritarianism are inseparable.”
As for culprits, Sanders has a list. His Johns Hopkins address lists Vladimir Putin of Russia, Viktor Orban of Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia as part of this global nexus of corruption and autocracy. He also singles out American billionaires like Robert Mercer and Sheldon Adelson for “promoting a shared agenda of intolerance and bigotry” as part of a “common front” of authoritarianism. And while Sanders was silent on Venezuela in these speeches, he has criticized the government of Nicolás Maduro in other venues, attacking its authoritarianism and suppression of democracy while rejecting intervention by the United States.
If these are the conditions of international relations, then the aim of American foreign policy should be to stand against this rising tide of illiberalism and oligarchy. For Sanders, the United States must create a global order that can constrain authoritarian states and bring democratic accountability to global capitalism. It must also embrace the cooperation necessary for tackling climate change and other transnational challenges, building “partnerships not just between governments, but between peoples” and recognizing that “our safety and welfare is bound up with the safety and welfare of others around the world.”
For this project to succeed, however, Americans must also strive for fairness and equality in their own country. “If we are going to expound the virtues of democracy and justice abroad, and be taken seriously, we need to practice those values here at home,” Sanders says.
It’s a robust vision — an expansion of Sanders’s cry for “political revolution.” He even uses similar terms, closing his Johns Hopkins speech with a call for “an international movement that mobilizes behind a vision of shared prosperity, security and dignity for all people.” There are, however, some missing parts. It’s unclear how a President Sanders would approach tense relations with China or deal with democratic decline in Eastern European countries like Poland. And Sanders isn’t alone in thinking and talking about these issues — Elizabeth Warren has also laid out a foreign policy framework, with a similar focus on protecting democracy and curtailing global corruption, and considerable detail on how to get it done.
But Warren has centered her presidential campaign on changing the rules of the American economy. And while Sanders can easily compete here, his bona fides from his 2016 campaign may not be enough to differentiate himself with voters who might not care that he was first on these issues.
What separates him from the pack in this race are his forceful and well-defined foreign policy views — his synthesis of domestic and international concerns. Rather than fight on old, now-crowded ground, he can move to new territory, opening vital conversations about America’s role in the world. He can bring a new set of progressive ideas to the Democratic mainstream and force his opponents to debate them on his terms. In doing so, Sanders could establish himself as the leading candidate for progressive Democrats who want to rebuild the nation’s reputation and influence as much as its economy.
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香港港彩金书【第】【四】【百】【八】【十】【章】【瓶】【儿】【身】【世】 【上】【官】【大】【人】【淡】【淡】【道】，“【这】【三】【十】【个】【弟】【兄】【一】【个】【都】【不】【会】【有】【事】。【我】【之】【所】【以】【如】【此】【安】【排】，【只】【是】【为】【了】【防】【止】【有】【人】【上】【山】【去】【青】【云】【观】【而】【已】，【按】【理】【来】【说】【他】【们】【除】【了】【这】【七】【个】，【不】【会】【再】【有】【人】【活】【着】【了】。【你】【还】【不】【错】，【歇】【着】【去】【吧】。” 【此】【时】【那】【七】【人】【中】【一】【个】【青】【衣】【人】【披】【散】【长】【发】，【盯】【着】【那】【上】【官】【大】【人】，“【上】【官】【无】【名】！” 【上】【官】【无】【名】【面】【色】【平】【淡】，
【第】【四】【百】【九】【十】【九】【章】 【苏】【慕】【锦】【很】【少】【让】【自】【己】【的】【刺】【露】【出】【来】 【苏】【慕】【锦】【很】【少】【让】【自】【己】【的】【刺】【露】【出】【来】，【毕】【竟】【身】【处】【在】【娱】【乐】【圈】，【稍】【有】【不】【妥】，【行】【为】【将】【会】【被】【无】【数】【的】【放】【大】，【所】【要】【面】【对】【的】【事】【与】【物】【也】【变】【得】【沉】【重】【许】【多】。 【涂】【酒】【赶】【到】【时】【候】，【就】【瞧】【见】【几】【人】【针】【锋】【相】【对】【的】【模】【样】，【从】【工】【作】【人】【员】【嘴】【中】【得】【知】【事】【情】【始】【末】。 【作】【为】【唯】【一】【的】“【公】【关】【人】”，【自】【发】【找】【了】【乔】【盛】【顿】【商】【量】
【一】【中】。 【高】【一】【二】【班】。 “【请】【问】……【你】【是】【言】【软】？” 【言】【软】【回】【到】【班】【级】【没】【多】【久】，【就】【把】【下】【午】【要】【考】【的】【书】【都】【拿】【了】【出】【来】，【虽】【然】【书】【上】【的】【不】【一】【定】【考】【得】【到】，【但】【看】【看】【又】【没】【什】【么】，【万】【一】【被】【她】【碰】【上】【了】，【她】【还】【能】【做】【出】【来】【不】【是】？【这】【样】【不】【就】【又】【多】【了】【几】【分】【吗】？ 【不】【过】【这】【古】【诗】【够】【难】【背】【的】【啊】！ 【正】【在】【绞】【尽】【脑】【汁】【背】【课】【本】【的】【言】【软】【突】【然】【被】【人】【给】【打】【断】【了】，【一】【瞬】【间】【脑】香港港彩金书【陆】【拾】【叁】【叫】【了】【两】【个】【个】【代】【驾】，【开】【车】【准】【备】【续】【摊】【儿】，【今】【儿】【大】【家】【都】【挺】【高】【兴】【的】，【虽】【然】【白】【行】【和】【陆】【小】【肆】【两】【个】【人】【见】【面】【就】【开】【始】【战】【备】【状】【态】，【但】【其】【实】，【还】【是】【会】【觉】【得】【很】【高】【兴】【的】，【毕】【竟】【真】【的】【是】【好】【久】【不】【见】【了】，【时】【隔】【多】【年】【再】【见】【面】，【发】【现】【距】【离】【没】【有】【被】【时】【间】【拉】【远】，【真】【的】【是】【很】【欣】【慰】【的】。 【续】【摊】【儿】【的】【地】【方】【陆】【拾】【叁】【选】【的】【是】H【市】【比】【较】【有】【名】【的】【酒】【吧】，【也】【就】【是】【上】【次】【被】【她】【砸】【场】【子】
【徐】【朗】【有】【些】【懵】，【事】【情】【变】【得】【很】【突】【然】，【但】【是】【最】【让】【他】【关】【心】【的】【是】【殷】【狂】【和】【玉】【雪】【心】【为】【什】【么】【会】【出】【现】【在】【这】【里】。 “【殷】【狂】，【这】【是】【怎】【么】【回】【事】？” 【殷】【狂】【抹】【了】【一】【把】【汗】，【他】【把】【手】【一】【松】，【聚】【在】【他】【手】【里】【的】【那】【个】【巨】【大】【的】【水】【球】【顿】【时】【化】【作】【瀑】【布】【散】【落】【在】【地】【上】，【里】【面】【四】【个】【惊】【慌】【失】【措】【的】【女】【孩】【紧】【紧】【地】【抱】【在】【一】【起】，【惊】【恐】【的】【看】【着】【外】【面】。 “【无】【恨】【无】【悔】！” 【徐】【朗】【一】【愣】，
“【啊】！” 【那】【菲】【儿】【有】【些】【怪】【异】【的】【看】【了】【看】【富】【家】【公】【子】，【小】【声】【的】【嘟】【囔】【道】:“【难】【怪】【我】【感】【觉】【他】【娘】【兮】【兮】【的】，【原】【来】【是】【那】【方】【面】【有】【问】【题】，【我】【就】【说】【嘛】。” 【菲】【儿】【的】【话】【虽】【然】【说】【得】【很】【轻】，【却】【一】【字】【不】【落】【的】【传】【入】【了】【富】【家】【公】【子】【的】【耳】【中】。 【富】【家】【公】【子】【皱】【了】【皱】【眉】【道】:“【你】【这】【里】【到】【底】【还】【有】【没】【有】【好】【玩】【儿】【的】【地】【方】【了】，【没】【有】，【我】【可】【就】【走】【了】。” 【菲】【儿】【看】【了】【看】【富】【家】【公】
【文】【弥】【之】【走】【后】，【怀】【菊】【跑】【来】【禀】【告】【说】，【薛】【子】【峰】【前】【来】【求】【见】，【这】【令】【文】【弥】【之】【十】【分】【地】【诧】【异】。 【该】【不】【会】【这】【家】【伙】【又】【想】【找】【我】【什】【么】【麻】【烦】【吧】？【唐】【风】【心】【想】。 【自】【和】【薛】【子】【峰】【签】【订】【完】【协】【议】【后】，【他】【们】【确】【实】【已】【经】【很】【长】【时】【间】【没】【有】【见】【面】【了】。 “【薛】【公】【子】【怎】【么】【会】【大】【驾】【光】【临】？” 【看】【着】【薛】【子】【峰】【慌】【里】【慌】【张】【的】，【唐】【风】【寒】【暄】【说】【道】。 “【这】【些】【天】【不】【见】【唐】【兄】，【甚】【是】【想】【念】，